Understanding Recent Federal Actions | "Energy Emergency" Declaration and State Energy Policies
July 1, 2025
This explainer is part of GCC’s efforts to help state officials and stakeholders understand how recent federal actions may affect state policies and programs related to energy and climate change. Our goal is for this explainer to remain useful and accurate in a rapidly changing landscape, therefore we will be updating this article as needed. This reflects Georgetown Climate Center’s understanding of the status of these policies as of July 1, 2025. This explainer was authored by Melissa Birchard with contributions from Nate Burnand, Amanda Lineberry, and Kim Wood. To share feedback regarding this analysis or information that you think should be added, clarified or updated, please contact climate@georgetown.edu. View GCC's other Understanding Recent Federal Actions explainers here.
What you need to know
On Inauguration Day, the Administration formally declared an “energy emergency,”See footnote 1 asserting authority under the National Emergencies Act and arguing that “The United States’ insufficient energy production, transportation, refining, and generation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to our Nation’s economy, national security, and foreign policy.”See footnote 2 Since January 20, 2025, the Administration has issued several other executive orders and taken administrative actions based on and related to the Energy Emergency Declaration. States are already challenging many of these actions and those challenges are working their way through the courts. This explainer provides an overview of these actions and the issues they raise for states and consumers.
Overview
In its first five months, the Trump Administration has taken the following actions to declare and act on an energy emergency:
- On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Energy Emergency Declaration and invoked broad executive authorities granted to the president during times of emergency by the National Emergencies Act (NEA).See footnote 3
- The same day, President Trump issued the “Unleashing American Energy” executive order, which directs the “heads of all agencies” to explore all emergency powers available to them and lays out many of the Trump Administration’s energy policy priorities,See footnote 4 such as “to protect the United States’ economic and national security and military preparedness by ensuring that an abundant supply of reliable energy is readily accessible in every State and territory of the Nation.”See footnote 5
- Also that day, the Trump Administration issued an executive order entitled “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid,” which directs DOE to develop a new reserve margin methodology and to use emergency authorities to (a) stop “any generation resource identified as critical within an at-risk region” from disconnecting from the grid and (b) stop identified generation resources greater than 50 MW from either disconnecting or switching to a fuel with a lesser accredited capacity.
- DOE issued two emergency orders, on May 23 and May 31, directing a natural gas-fired power plant in Pennsylvania and a coal-fired power plant in Michigan, respectively, to stay online, just days before their planned retirement dates.See footnote 6
Analysis
Over the past five months, the Trump Administration has published a series of executive orders and presidential memoranda that start to lay out the Administration’s emerging energy and environmental strategy. The declaration of an energy emergency serves as the basis on which many other aspects of the approach are built.See footnote 7 Other building blocks include an executive order also issued January 20 entitled “Unleashing American Energy”See footnote 8 and two executive orders issued April 8 entitled “Protecting American Energy from State Overreach”See footnote 9 and “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid.”See footnote 10 Each of these orders or declarations has been followed by specific actions taken by federal agencies such as the U.S Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).
This analysis will provide an overview of how these orders and declarations collectively form a federal energy policy premised on an emergency that many disagree exists. While this explainer touches briefly on some implications of these actions on state environmental laws, the focus is primarily on what these early actions say about the Administration’s energy policy, including how and to what extent this policy impacts space traditionally occupied by the states.
Key Laws Underlying Many of These Actions
Two federal laws enable the executive branch to declare an energy emergency. The first is the National Emergencies ActSee footnote 11 and the second is the Federal Power Act, in particular Section 202(c).See footnote 12
The NEA
The National Emergencies Act (NEA) of 1976 established the exclusive means by which the president can declare a “national emergency.”See footnote 13 It formalized the president’s authority to declare an emergency, and provided transparency requirements and guardrails for that authority.See footnote 14 One of the guardrails Congress originally built into the law was the ability to terminate a presidential emergency by simple majority vote of Congress.See footnote 15 Due to later legal challenges and amendments, such Congressional action is now subject to presidential veto.See footnote 16 As a result, a two-thirds majority in both chambers of Congress would be required to override a veto and end an emergency declaration.See footnote 17 A national emergency declaration automatically expires after one year, although it can be renewed for an additional year.See footnote 18 Through the NEA, the President can exercise additional powers in the areas of both energy and the environment, including the power to expedite or waive specific environmental processes.See footnote 19 The law also has applicability to other subjects.
FPA Section 202(c)
The Federal Power Act (FPA) is the foundational law establishing what authorities the federal government has to regulate electric transmission and the sale of electricity.See footnote 20 FPA Section 201(b)(1) grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) jurisdiction over the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of wholesale energy in interstate commerce, but explicitly withholds jurisdiction over “facilities used for the generation of electric energy, as well as facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” expressly reserving that scope of jurisdiction for the states.See footnote 21
FPA Section 202(c) enables the U.S. Department of Energy to issue an order finding that an emergency exists involving the electric grid.See footnote 22 According to this provision, an emergency can be called, either upon request or at the initiative of DOE, in one or a combination of three circumstances. These are: (1) the event of a war, (2) the event of a sudden increase in the demand for electricity, or (3) the event of a shortage of electricity.See footnote 23 After declaring such an emergency, the Secretary of Energy can order temporary actions such as requiring generation to run to relieve the emergency.See footnote 24
Congress passed the FPA in 1935, after World War I and before World War II, and this provision was initially used primarily as a wartime authority.See footnote 25 It enabled the executive branch to take measures to protect the electric system, and respond to unforeseen attacks or disasters. This authority largely was unused between 1972 and the year 2000.See footnote 26 Then, in 2000 to 2001, California experienced an unprecedented energy crisis.See footnote 27 During that period, the state experienced significant heat and increased demand on the electric grid. DOE issued an order establishing an emergency under FPA Section 202(c),See footnote 28 which enabled California’s electric grid operator to direct certain generators to sell electricity into the market during specified hours to help alleviate the crisis.See footnote 29 The grid operator was first required to attempt to secure adequate generation in the market, and, failing that, had to file a signed certification at DOE stating that it was “unable to acquire in the market adequate supplies to meet system demand” before contacting generators to request out-of-market emergency generation.See footnote 30
Over the last 25 years, rare events such as hurricanes and heatwaves have prompted additional emergency declarations under FPA Section 202(c), but DOE has typically granted emergency requests from grid operators only in cases of extreme weather lasting hours or at most days.See footnote 31 Often the grid operator has been required to provide specific documentation of an acute emergency along with a record of what out-of-market services were ultimately required to support the electric grid, if any.See footnote 32
Establishing a National Energy Emergency
The Trump Administration has issued four interconnected EOs on energy and the environment that are founded on the assertion that there is a national emergency that empowers the federal government to override established laws and practices. Each of these EOs references emergency authorities derived from the National Emergencies Act, Federal Power Act Section 202(c), and/or other laws. The states have already challenged or requested rehearing of some of these orders and related agency actions.
“Declaring a National Energy Emergency” Executive Order
On January 20, 2025, the President issued an order entitled “Declaring a National Energy Emergency,” a declaration that was subsequently provided to Congress and published in the Federal Register.See footnote 33 This declaration relies on executive authority under the National Emergencies Act. The declaration states that there is “an active threat to the American people from high energy prices,” that “our Nation’s dangerous energy situation inflicts unnecessary and perilous constraints on our foreign policy,” and that the country’s “inadequate development of domestic energy resources leaves us vulnerable to hostile foreign actors.” In doing so, the declaration argues that (a) there is an energy emergency that affects national security, foreign policy, and international trade, and (b) swift federal action is “an immediate and pressing priority” to protect “the United States’ national and economic security.”See footnote 34 While the declaration primarily blames “harmful and shortsighted policies of the previous administration” for this alleged situation, it also asserts that “dangerous State and local policies jeopardize our Nation’s core national defense and security needs.”See footnote 35
The Energy Emergency Declaration directs federal agency heads to identify and use any available emergency and other authorities to facilitate all aspects of domestic energy resource development.See footnote 36 The declaration further directs agency heads to “identify and exercise any lawful emergency authorities available to them, as well as all other lawful authorities they may possess, to facilitate the identification, leasing, siting, production, transportation, refining, and generation of domestic energy resources, including, but not limited to, on Federal lands” including the use of federal eminent domain authority under the Defence Production Act.See footnote 37 The declaration is broad, rather than focused specifically on electricity, and does not mention the Federal Power Act.
The Energy Emergency Declaration is currently being challenged in court. On May 9, 2025, fifteen state attorneys general (AGs) challenged the declaration.See footnote 38 The state AGs argue that the Energy Emergency Declaration was not issued in response to a true emergency as defined by the National Emergency Act and that the Energy Emergency Declaration serves as a vehicle for the Trump Administration to violate the law and ignore existing federal regulations.See footnote 39 In their complaint, the AGs point out that while the Administration’s emergency declaration argues there is a shortage of generation, domestic oil and natural gas production is at an all time high, while the development of other forms of energy generation like wind and solar are excluded from the emergency declaration.See footnote 40 The AGs also state that the “Executive Order’s emergency declaration is not based on any real emergency, nor does the Executive Order attempt to address one.”See footnote 41 Instead, they argue it is based on the assertion of an unfounded ‘ “emergency” declared largely in response to disagreement with “the policies of the previous administration” and of states in the Northeast and West Coast.’See footnote 42
“Unleashing American Energy” Executive Order
Also on January 20, 2025, the White House published an executive order (EO) entitled “Unleashing American Energy.”See footnote 43 This EO announces several Trump Administration policies that have since been acted upon by federal agencies, such as eliminating national support for electric vehicles, increasing exploration for and production of fuels and minerals in Federal lands and waters, and eliminating support for appliance efficiency standards.See footnote 44
The EO also directs agency heads to review all existing regulations and to suspend, revise, or rescind any regulations that “impose an undue burden on the identification, development, or use of domestic energy - with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower, biofuels, critical mineral[sic], and nuclear energy resources.”See footnote 45 Like the Energy Emergency Declaration, this EO states that these steps are necessary to protect national security, for example to “rebuild our Nation’s economic and military security.”See footnote 46 The EO also directs agency heads to “use all possible authorities, including emergency authorities, to expedite the adjudication of Federal permits” for projects that “an agency head deems essential for the Nation’s economy or national security.”See footnote 47 The EO concludes that such acts are necessary to “ensur[e] that an abundant supply of reliable energy is readily accessible in every State and territory of the Nation.”See footnote 48
“Protecting American Energy from State Overreach” Executive Order
On April 8, 2025, the White House published an executive order entitled “Protecting American Energy from State Overreach.”See footnote 49 This EO asserts that state climate, environmental justice, and energy laws “undermine Federalism by projecting the regulatory preferences of a few States into all States”See footnote 50 and are “irreconcilable with my Administration’s objective to unleash American energy.”See footnote 51 This order directs the Attorney General to do three things:See footnote 52
- Identify all state and local laws that allegedly “burden” domestic energy;
- “Stop” the enforcement of any laws she deems to be “illegal;” and
- Report back to the President in 60 days, or by June 7, 2025, with information about initial actions already taken against such laws and programs in the courts.
The EO also directs the Attorney General to identify other executive and legislative actions necessary to stop enforcement of relevant state laws.See footnote 53
“Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid” Executive Order
Also on April 8, 2025, the White House published an executive order entitled “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid.”See footnote 54 This order builds off of the January 20 Energy Emergency Declaration. Whereas that declaration is very broad, discussing everything from fuel and mineral exploration and extraction to transportation and generation, this order focuses exclusively on electric generation. This EO asserts that the electric grid is experiencing an unprecedented surge in demand, and that this rising demand justifies emergency action specific to the electric grid.See footnote 55 It refers back to the January 20 declaration of an “energy emergency” and highlights the need for what the order calls “secure, redundant fuel supplies that are capable of extended operations.”See footnote 56
The EO directs the Secretary of Energy to do three main things:
- “[S]treamline, systematize, and expedite” processes under the Federal Power Act for issuing emergency orders to support the electric grid.See footnote 57
- Develop a “uniform methodology for analyzing current and anticipated reserve margins for all regions of the country…regulated by FERC” and use that new methodology to “identify current and anticipated regions with reserve margins below acceptable thresholds.”See footnote 58 In developing the methodology, DOE is directed to “accredit generation resources…based on historical performance of each specific generation resource.”See footnote 59 The EO requires DOE to provide that methodology and those findings to the President within 30 days (by May 8) and then to publicly publish them by July 7.See footnote 60
- Establish a “process” and a “protocol” to (a) identify generators that will need to be “retained,” including by using emergency authorities under Federal Power Act Section 202(c), and to (b) “prevent” a generating facility “in excess of 50 MW of nameplate capacity” from being converted to a generation source or fuel that results in a lower accredited value (i.e. <50 MW).See footnote 61
A “reserve margin” methodology is typically developed by an electric grid operator to determine how much electricity needs to be available - i.e., held in “reserve” - to meet maximum possible electricity demand. This methodology is normally developed on a regional basis by the local electric grid operator based on a variety of factors, including historical and future trends, and can be influenced by state policy (e.g., state electrification policy). Each region’s reserve margin is typically determined by the local grid operator with input from stakeholders including the states, and is subject to approval by FERC.See footnote 62 The DOE is not normally involved in these processes.
“Accrediting” generation resources is how a grid operator assesses each type of generation - such as solar, wind, coal, and natural gas - and assigns to it a value for how much it benefits the electric system, factoring in weather, historical availability, and other variables. That value helps to determine what compensation the resource will receive. This is sometimes determined on a seasonal basis to account for weather conditions and fuel availability variations, e.g., in winter versus summer.See footnote 63 It is always done on a regional rather than national basis, because many factors affecting generation are location-specific, such as weather, pipeline capacity, deliverability by truck, rail, or boat, competition by other local sources of demand (e.g. residential heat may compete for limited natural gas or oil supplies), and market-specific business practices.See footnote 64
The EO directs DOE to develop a new “uniform” reserve margin methodology, to use that methodology to identify areas of the country with “current and anticipated” reserve margins below acceptable thresholds,” and to provide that methodology and those findings to the President by May 8. The EO does not require publication of the results until July 7, 2025, however, a centralized and “uniform” approach carried out by DOE rather than a local grid operator would appear to depart from past practice. In the past, each region of the country has developed its own separate methodology with input from stakeholders and subject to review and approval by FERC, with additional stakeholder input.
While the EO directs the Secretary of Energy to develop a “process” and “protocol” to identify generators that will need to be “retained,” including by using authorities under FPA Section 202(c), DOE has already issued orders under FPA Section 202(c) finding that specific generators must be “retained” - i.e. kept from retiring or shutting down due to age, inefficiency, cost, or pollution, regardless of other laws or pre-existing decisions by state or federal agencies.
Agency Implementation of the Executive Orders & State Pushback
DOE’s Issuance of FPA Section 202(c) Emergency Orders to Keep Power Plants Online
In May, the Administration invoked FPA Section 202(c) to order power plants to stay online, in accordance with the Energy Emergency Declaration and the “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid” EO. As of the date of publication, the Secretary of Energy has issued two FPA Section 202(c) emergency orders halting power plant closures days before their planned retirement dates.See footnote 65
On May 23, 2025, DOE ordered the J.H. Campbell coal-fired power plant in Michigan, owned and operated by Consumers Energy, to stay open for the duration of the summer, just one week before its planned retirement date.See footnote 66 One week later, on May 30, DOE issued a second FPA Section 202(c) emergency order to Constellation Energy, the owner of a power plant in Pennsylvania.See footnote 67 That order directed Constellation Energy not to shut down two units at the Eddystone Generation Station, which is a combined oil and natural gas power plant.See footnote 68 The order was issued on the same day as the plant’s planned retirement, requiring that the units stay open past their intended retirement, through the summer period.
The FPA 202(c) emergency order in Michigan contradicted an order issued three years earlier by the Michigan Public Service Commission allowing the retirement of that plant,See footnote 69 as well as an order by the Midwest grid operator, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), that determined the plant was not necessary for reliability purposes.See footnote 70 The Pennsylvania order contradicted a 2024 decision by the MidAtlantic grid operator, PJM, to approve that plant’s retirement rather than requiring it to continue to run for reliability reasons.See footnote 71 (The Eddystone power plant sells electricity directly into the regional wholesale electricity market and is not required by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission to seek permission from that agency before retiring.See footnote 72)
Pushback to the 202(c) Actions from States and Grid Operators
Following DOE’s FPA Section 202(c) order directing the J.H. Campbell coal-fired power plant in Michigan to remain open past its planned retirement date, the region’s independent grid operator, MISO, confirmed to news publications that it projects adequate energy supplies in the region for the coming year,See footnote 73 and that it did not request the emergency order.See footnote 74 The Chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission stated, “There is no existing energy emergency in either Michigan or MISO.”See footnote 75 The Michigan commission affirmed this position on June 20 in a FERC docket regarding cost allocation for the costs of running the plant, noting it “adamantly disputes that there is, in fact, an energy emergency that warrants the use of the Federal Power Act to keep the Campbell plant open and operational.”See footnote 76
On June 18, 2025, Michigan’s Attorney General requested rehearing of the FPA Section 202(c) order - a step required prior to filing a legal challenge of the order.See footnote 77 The request for rehearing called the Administration’s claims that there is an energy emergency “untethered from the need to identify a real emergency and unhindered by the statutory requirement that the actions it orders go no further than necessary to address the emergency.” See footnote 78
On June 23, 2025, the Organization of MISO States (OMS), a non-profit that represents the fifteen states within the MISO region, also filed a request for rehearing.See footnote 79 The OMS request takes issue with DOE’s failure to consult MISO, the Michigan Public Service Commission, or other state regulatory bodies prior to issuing the order.See footnote 80 OMS also argues that the order “undermines the federal-state regulatory balance, is a violation of the Federal Power Act, the cooperative federalism principles, and longstanding practices including the FERC Policy on State-Federal Collaboration.”See footnote 81 While not all 15 of the MISO states signed onto the request for rehearing, two of the seven signatory states are led by Republican governors and five are led by Democratic governors.See footnote 82
Relatedly, in comments submitted in June to a FERC docket created to assess risks to electric grid reliability due to increased demand, a MISO official stated that the grid operator is “confident that the [MISO] footprint will continue to be resource adequate in the near and longer term.”See footnote 83 In the same docket, a PJM official states that “PJM has and continues to have adequate resources to meet projected demand in the near future.”See footnote 84 Other grid operators similarly indicated that, although additional generation is expected to be needed in coming years to meet rising demand from data centers and other electricity consumers, there is no imminent or current emergency.See footnote 85
The deadline to submit requests for rehearing of the FPA 202(c) order directing Constellation Energy to keep the Eddystone Generation Plant online is June 30, 2025.
DOI emergency permitting procedures
The two FPA Section 202(c) orders issued by DOE are part of a broader constellation of actions by several agencies that build on the Administration’s declaration of an energy emergency and related EOs. The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) has implemented “emergency permitting procedures to accelerate the development of domestic energy resources and critical minerals,” grounding these in the Energy Emergency Declaration.See footnote 86 These procedures shorten a process that normally takes 1-2 years into just a few weeks.See footnote 87 DOI is already approving expedited permits to projects using those procedures.See footnote 88 Fifteen states are challenging these emergency permitting procedures in court as part of the lawsuit against the energy emergency declaration filed on May 9.See footnote 89
DOJ lawsuits against states
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed lawsuits against four states, two challenging Vermont’s and New York’s state climate superfund laws and two preemptively challenging threatened civil liability lawsuits by Michigan and Hawaii against fossil fuel companies.See footnote 90 All four are premised in part on the Energy Emergency Declaration and the perceived conflict between state climate action and an “energy crisis” as laid out in the “Protecting American Energy from State Overreach” EO.See footnote 91 The four states’ responses to these lawsuits are still developing, but New York has filed an answer saying the United States is not entitled to “any relief whatsoever”See footnote 92 from the court and Michigan has also moved to dismiss the complaint against it as premature.See footnote 93 The four complaints include nearly identical claims and content, suggesting the DOJ may use the same or similar arguments in other contexts involving state law and policy.
Where We Are Now and What to Expect Next
Over the past few weeks, DOE’s use of its emergency authorities under FPA Section 202(c) has been expanded beyond historical practice. Since the FPA became law in 1935, the executive branch has used its emergency provisions sparingly, though at an increased rate since 2000 due primarily to a greater incidence of extreme weather events of finite length (e.g. hours or days).See footnote 94 In the past, FPA 202(c) orders have typically been issued by DOE at the request of the local electric grid operator, and to our knowledge have never been issued contrary to the express findings of the regional electric grid operator, as an expert entity independent of the executive branch and authorized by FERC.
It is also unclear who will pay the costs to keep the Campbell and Eddystone power plants in Michigan and Pennsylvania running. Consumers Energy and MISO have been unable to agree on who will pay to keep the Campbell plant online, and the issue has been referred to FERC for a decision.See footnote 95 How costs are allocated by FERC will determine whether Consumers Energy and its customers alone pay to keep the Campbell plant online, or if customers across the MISO region as a whole will pay to implement the DOE’s recent 202(c) order in Michigan. If FERC decides to distribute the costs across the MISO region, the cost impacts of the DOE’s use of FPA Section 202(c) orders on energy affordability could begin to be felt across much of the Midwest. Cost allocation has also not yet been determined for the Eddystone plant in Pennsylvania.See footnote 96 FERC’s decision on how to allocate the costs to keep inefficient fossil fuel-fired power plants online pursuant to FPA Section 202(c) orders in the MISO region may set precedent for how the expenses associated with keeping outdated coal and natural gas power plants will fall to consumers in the event that DOE continues to issue out-of-market FPA Section 202(c) orders.
The outcome of pending litigation may impact how expansively the Administration uses its emergency authorities. Many of the Administration’s executive actions rest on the President’s original January 20 Energy Emergency Declaration. If the 15 state attorneys general prevail in their court challenge to that declaration, the Administration’s efforts to abridge state authority to pursue energy policy may be curtailed. The outcome of the Michigan Attorney General’s challenge to DOE’s May emergency order under FPA Section 202(c) may also help to determine how expansively DOE can use emergency FPA authority in the future.
Space for Continued State Action
It is well established that federal laws reserve for the states significant authority over energy and environmental policy.See footnote 97 The FPA specifically reserves for the states authority over siting and permitting of generation,See footnote 98 where power plants are not located on federal land, which has long been interpreted to give states primary authority over determining the energy mix.See footnote 99 Absent major legislative changes in Congress, the Administration therefore must rely on authorities unique to the federal executive branch, such the the National Emergencies Act, in seeking to override state jurisdictional authority. The legal and factual basis of those overrides and “emergencies,” however, is currently being argued in the courts,See footnote 100 along with other charges of executive overreach on topics ranging from policing, federal funding, and immigration. In the energy and climate space, states can continue to collaborate and innovate. State climate and energy laws have repeatedly been upheld in the court.See footnote 101
Finally, regarding major infrastructure planning for climate and energy, these projects can often take a decade or longer to complete. While legal and financial uncertainty has impacted some infrastructure projects since January,See footnote 102 the time horizon of the energy transition will last beyond the scale of a presidential term. In the meantime, the long-term planning and cross-agency coordination critical to ensuring a successful, reliable, clean, and affordable energy transition can continue to take place at the state level. Some of the key steps that states continue to take include coordinating interregional transmission plans with neighbors,See footnote 103 engaging in the cross-agency and industry collaboration needed to electrify transportation including medium and heavy-duty vehicles, and filling gaps that the change in federal policy leaves behind, including with respect to supply chain and financial incentives for clean energy technologies.
Endnotes:
1
1. Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 29, 2025), View Source (hereinafter E.O. 14156). | Back to contentBack to content
2
2. E.O. 14156, Sec. 1. Back to contentBack to content
3
3. E.O. 14156. Back to contentBack to content
4
4. Exec. Order 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 (Jan. 29, 2025), View Source (hereinafter E.O. 14154). | Back to contentBack to content
5
5. E.O. 14154, Sec. 2(c). Back to contentBack to content
6
6. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, DOE’s Use of Federal Power Act Emergency Authority (May 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
7
7. E.O. 14156. Back to contentBack to content
8
8. E.O. 14154. Back to contentBack to content
9
9. E.O. 14260. Back to contentBack to content
10
10. Exec. Order No. 14262, 90 Fed. Reg. 15521 (April 8, 2025), View Source (hereinafter E.O. 14262). | Back to contentBack to content
11
11. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651. Back to contentBack to content
12
12. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c). Back to contentBack to content
13
13. 50 U.S.C. § 1621. Back to contentBack to content
14
14. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1622. Back to contentBack to content
15
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b). Back to contentBack to content
16
16. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b)-(c). Back to contentBack to content
17
17. See Michael Greene, Cong. Rsch. Serv., National Emergencies Act: Expedited Procedures in the House and Senate (Feb. 3, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
18
18. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d). Back to contentBack to content
19
19. E.O. 14156. Back to contentBack to content
20
20. 16 U.S.C. § 824. Back to contentBack to content
21
21. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). Back to contentBack to content
22
22. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c). Back to contentBack to content
23
23. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1). Back to contentBack to content
24
24. Id. Back to contentBack to content
25
25. See Ashley J. Lawson, Cong. Rsch. Serv., Federal Power Act: The Department of Energy’s Emergency Authority, at 1 (May 22, 2025), View Source; Benjamin Rolsma, The New Reliability Override, 57 Conn. L. Rev. 789, 793 (May 2025). | Back to contentBack to content
26
26. Rolsma, supra note 25, at 842-43. Back to contentBack to content
27
27. Id. Back to contentBack to content
28
28. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Order Pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (Dec. 14, 2000), View Source | Back to contentBack to content
29
29. Id.; Notice of Issuance of Emergency Orders Under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, 65 Fed. Reg. 82989 (Dec. 14, 2000), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
30
30. Notice of Issuance of Emergency Orders Under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, 65 Fed. Reg. 82990 (Dec. 29, 2000), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
31
31. See Rolsma, supra note 25, at 839-42. Back to contentBack to content
32
32. 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.373(d), 205.377(b). Back to contentBack to content
33
33. E.O. 14156. Back to contentBack to content
34
34. E.O. 14156, Sec. 1. Back to contentBack to content
35
35. Id. Back to contentBack to content
36
36. Id. at Sec. 2(a). Back to contentBack to content
37
37. Id. Back to contentBack to content
38
38. Compl., Washington v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00869 (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
39
39. Id. at ¶¶ 1-7. Back to contentBack to content
40
40. Id. at ¶¶ 100-06. Back to contentBack to content
41
41. Compl., New York et al. v. Trump, No. 1:25‑cv‑03456 (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
42
42. Id. at ¶ 115. Back to contentBack to content
43
43. E.O. 14154. Back to contentBack to content
44
44. Id. Back to contentBack to content
45
45. E.O. 14154, Sec. 3(a). Back to contentBack to content
46
46. E.O. 14154, Sec. 1. Back to contentBack to content
47
47. E.O. 14154, Sec. 5(d). Back to contentBack to content
48
48. E.O. 14154, Sec. 2(c). Back to contentBack to content
49
49. E.O. 14260. Back to contentBack to content
50
50. E.O. 14260, Sec. 1. Back to contentBack to content
51
51. Id. Back to contentBack to content
52
52. E.O. 14260, Sec. 2. Back to contentBack to content
53
53. E.O. 14260, Sec. 2(b). Back to contentBack to content
54
54. E.O. 14262. Back to contentBack to content
55
55. E.O. 14262, Sec. 1. Back to contentBack to content
56
56. E.O. 14262, Sec. 2. Back to contentBack to content
57
57. E.O. 14262, Sec. 3(a). Back to contentBack to content
58
58. E.O. 14262, Sec. 3(b). Back to contentBack to content
59
59. E.O. 14262, Sec. 3(b)(ii). Back to contentBack to content
60
60. E.O. 14262, Sec. 3(b)(iii). Back to contentBack to content
61
61. E.O. 14262, Secs. 3(c)(i), 3(c)(ii). Back to contentBack to content
62
62. Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab’y, Fundamentals of Power Grid Reliability and Clean Electricity, at 3-7 (Jan. 2024), View Source">View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
63
63. Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Resource Accreditation White Paper, at 1 (March 2024), View Source">View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
64
64. Id. at 13. Back to contentBack to content
65
65. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, supra note 6. Back to contentBack to content
66
66. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Order No. 202-25-3, at 5 (May 23, 2025), View Source">View Source (“Given the determination that an emergency exists as discussed above, the responsibility of MISO to ensure reliability of its system, and the ability of MISO to identify and dispatch generation necessary to meet load requirements, I have determined that, under the conditions specified below, additional dispatch of the Campbell Plant is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c). This determination is based on the insufficiency of dispatchable capacity and anticipated demand during the summer months, and the potential loss of power to homes and local businesses in the areas that may be affected by curtailments or outages, presenting a risk to public health and safety.”). | Back to contentBack to content
67
67. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Order No. 202-25-4 (May 30, 2025), View Source">View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
68
68. Id. at 2 (“Given the emergency nature of resource adequacy concerns, the declared state of national energy emergency, the responsibility of PJM to ensure maximum reliability on its system, and the ability of PJM to identify and dispatch generation necessary to meet load requirements, I have determined that…operational availability and economic dispatch of the aforementioned Eddystone Units 3 and 4 (Eddystone Units) is necessary to best meet the emergency and serve the public interest for purposes of FPA section 202(c).”). Back to contentBack to content
70
69. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, MPSC approves Consumers Energy integrated resource plan settlement agreement, takes additional steps to boost electric capacity (June 23, 2022), View Source">View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
71
70. Consumers Energy Company, 2024 J.H. Campbell NOPP Annual Progress Report (Dec. 16, 2024), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
72
71. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Deactivation Notice for Eddystone Generating Units Nos. 3 & 4 (Apr. 30, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
73
72. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, Table 6.6. Planned U.S. Electric Generating Unit Retirements, View Source (last visited June 27, 2025). | Back to contentBack to content
74
73. Midcontinent Independent System Operator, MISO projects adequate resources are available to serve summer demand amid rising risks (May 8, 2025) View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
75
74. Ethan Howland, DOE orders 1.6-GW coal-fired power plant to delay shutdown over MISO outage concerns, Utility Dive (May 27, 2025), View Source | Back to contentBack to content
76
75. Ben Geman, Michigan order signals next stage of Energy Department’s coal support, Axios (May 27, 2025), View Source | Back to contentBack to content
77
76. Motion to Intervene and Comments of Michigan Public Service Commission in support of Consumer Energy Company's complaint, Docket No. EL25-90 (F.E.R.C. June 20, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
78
77. Request For Rehearing By Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel, at 1, Order No. 202-25-3 (U.S. Dep’t of Energy, June 18, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
79
78. Id. at 2. On the same day, a group of non-profit organizations also filed a request for rehearing, see Motion to Intervene and Request for Rehearing and Stay of Public Interest Organizations (Dep’t of Energy June 18, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
80
79. Petition to Intervene and Request for Rehearing of the Organization Of Miso States, Inc., Docket No. 202‑25‑3 (F.E.R.C. June 18, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
81
80. Id. at 4. Back to contentBack to content
82
81. Id. Back to contentBack to content
83
82. Id. at 7. Back to contentBack to content
84
83. Todd Ramey, Comments on behalf of Midcontinent ISO Inc., FERC, Docket No. AD24‑11‑000, at 9 (May 27, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
85
84. Manu Asthana, Prefiled Statement on Behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., FERC, Docket No. AD25-7-000, at 3 (May 27, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
86
85. See Gordon van Welie, Pre-Technical Conference Comments of ISO New England Inc., FERC, Docket No. AD25‑7‑000, at 1–2 (May 27, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
87
86. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Department of the Interior Implements Emergency Permitting Procedures to Strengthen Domestic Energy Supply (Apr. 23, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
88
87. Id. Back to contentBack to content
89
88. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Interior Expedites Permitting for Critical Energy Projects to Address National Energy Emergency (June 10, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
90
89. Washington v. Trump, supra note 38. Back to contentBack to content
91
90. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Complaints Against Hawaii, Michigan, New York and Vermont Over Unconstitutional State Climate Actions (May 1, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
92
91. Id. Back to contentBack to content
93
92. Answer at ¶ 114, United States v. New York, No. 1:25-cv-03656-PKC (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2025) View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
94
93. See Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Michigan, No. 1:25-cv-00496-JMB-SJB (D.M.I. June 20, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
95
94. See Lawson, supra note 25; Rolsma, supra note 25, at 796. Back to contentBack to content
96
95. Request of the U.S. Department of Energy for Proceedings and Final Order Regarding Rate Issues for Campbell Plant Under DOE Order No. 202-25-3, Docket No. EL25-90 (F.E.R.C. June 13, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
97
96. Devin Laith-Yessian, PJM Stakeholders Propose Cost Allocation Models for DOE Emergency Orders, RTO Insider (Jun 16, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
98
97. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (limiting federal regulation to non-state matters). See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416. Back to contentBack to content
99
98. See 16 U.S.C. § 824; New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 24 (2002) (“Among other things, Congress left to the States authority to regulate generation and transmission siting.”). Back to contentBack to content
100
99. See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150 (2016) (“Nothing in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from encouraging production of new or clean generation through measures ‘untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation.’”). Back to contentBack to content
101
100. Washington v. Trump, supra note 38; New York et al. v. Trump, supra note 41. Back to contentBack to content
102
101. See, e.g., Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007). Back to contentBack to content
103
102. See Diana DiGangi, Atlantic Shores Offshore Wind Asks to Terminate Project’s Renewable Energy Credits, Utility Dive (June 10, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content
104
103. See Northeast States Collaborative on Interregional Transmission, Request for Information on State-Led Interregional Transmission Projects (June 23, 2025), View Source. | Back to contentBack to content